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I. INTRODUCTION
The reelection of President George W. Bush in 2004 coincided with
the announcement that Chief Justice William Rehnquist was diagnosed
with thyroid cancer at the age of eighty.1 Based on the chemotherapy
and radiation treatments prescribed for Rehnquist, medical experts
speculated that Rehnquist had the most serious form of thyroid cancer.2
News reports predicted Rehnquist’s “imminent departure” from the
Court and speculated about who President Bush might appoint as a
replacement.3 One rumored replacement for Rehnquist as Chief Justice
is Justice Clarence Thomas who, according to his biographer, has been
interviewed by Bush administration officials as a possible choice for
elevation to Chief Justice.4 Because Thomas has been named, along with
Justice Antonin Scalia, as one of the justices that President Bush most
admires,5 it is possible that the next Chief Justice could come from
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University of Connecticut, 1988.
**
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1
Bill Mears et al., Rehnquist Has Thyroid Cancer Surgery, CNN.COM, Oct. 25, 2004,
available at www-cgi.cnn.com/2004/LAW/10/25/rehnquist.
2
Neil A. Lewis & Linda Greenhouse, New Round of Speculation About Rehnquist’s
Farewell, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 22, 2005, at 10.
3
Id.
4
Anne Gearan, Thomas Could Be Next Chief Justice, Writer Says, DETROIT FREE PRESS,
Aug. 7, 2004, available at http://www.freep.com/news/nw/thomas7e_20040807.htm.
5
Michael McGough, Bush Has a Chance to Remake High Court, PITTSBURGH POSTGAZETTE, Nov. 6, 2004, available at www.post-gazette.com/pg/04311/407789.stm.
*
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among the Court’s most conservative sitting justices.6 Thomas may be
an especially intriguing choice for Bush because he is the only Rehnquist
Court Justice below the age of sixty, and thus he may be able to serve on
the Court for many years to come.7
In light of Thomas’s prominence as a potential Chief Justice and as
the current justice who may have the longest term of service yet ahead of
him, there is good reason to examine Thomas’s judicial philosophy and
decisions. In this Article, I look closely at one of Thomas’s key opinions
concerning deprivations of liberty and consider its implications in light
of Thomas’s opinions on related issues.
Thomas prides himself on his fealty to the intentions of the
Constitution’s framers in order to, in his words, “fulfill our
constitutionally assigned role of giving full effect to the mandate of the
Framers without infusing the constitutional fabric with our own political
views.”8 In his opinions, Thomas consistently advocates interpretation
of the Constitution according to the intentions of the document’s
authors.9 Thomas describes the Supreme Court as “bound by the text of
the Constitution and by the intent of those who drafted and ratified it.”10
Critics of original intent jurisprudence have illuminated many of its
problems, including the difficulty of identifying a single intended

6
Scholars’ analyses of Thomas’s performance on the Supreme Court frequently note his
commitment to conservative philosophies and outcomes. For example, Professor Mark
Graber observes that “[n]o good reason exists why [Thomas] believes conservative
historians when historians clash or why he discards originalism completely when that
philosophy is hostile to certain conservative interests.” Mark A. Graber, Clarence Thomas
and the Perils of Amateur History, in REHNQUIST JUSTICE: UNDERSTANDING THE COURT
DYNAMIC 71 (Earl M. Maltz ed., 2003). Graber’s analysis concludes that “[w]hat unites
Thomas’s important concurring and dissenting opinions in constitutional cases is his
commitment to conservative or libertarian results rather than a commitment to any
particular theory of the judicial function.” Id. at 77. In addition to scholars’ substantive
assessments of his opinions, Thomas’s conservatism is evidenced by empirical studies that
show him to be one of the justices least likely to support individuals’ claims of right. See
Christopher E. Smith, The Rehnquist Court and Criminal Justice: An Empirical Assessment, 19 J.
CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 161, 171 (2003).
7
Thomas was born in 1948. Graber, supra note 6, at 71.
8
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 367 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring).
9
See Christopher E. Smith, Bent on Original Intent: Justice Thomas Is Asserting a Distinct
and Cohesive Vision, 82 A.B.A.J. 48, 48 (Oct. 1996) (“Thomas consistently advocates the strict
application of key tools for interpreting the Constitution: its text and history. Thomas’
opinions are replete with references to the original intent of the Constitution’s Framers,
English common law, and Anglo-American legal traditions.”).
10
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334, 370-71 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in judgment).
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meaning of each phrase to use as the definitive interpretation.11
Moreover, Thomas regularly demonstrates his disregard for historical
scholarship that runs counter to interpretations that support his desired
outcomes12 so that, ultimately, “[h]istory guides only some of his judicial
opinions.”13 Despite these flaws and inconsistencies in Thomas’s judicial
philosophy, he can be characterized as “espousing an interpretive
approach” that emphasizes obedience to the framers’ values and
intentions.14 As he seeks to carry out his version of the framers’ vision,
Thomas’s opinions can be assessed both in terms of their impact on the
lives of individual human beings and in terms of their consistency with
his other decisions and with the framers’ desire to protect the value of
liberty.
II. THE HAMDI CASE
An important test of Thomas’s view of the Constitution and its
meaning for governmental power and individual liberty arose in the case
of a U.S. citizen who was taken into custody in Afghanistan during
American military action against the Taliban regime and the al Qaeda

See, e.g., Judith A. Baer, The Fruitless Search for Original Intent, in JUDGING THE
CONSTITUTION: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON JUDICIAL LAWMAKING 59 (Michael W. McCann &
Gerald L. Houseman eds., 1989).
So no jurisprudence of original intention is possible, because original
intention is undiscoverable. We can and should go to the primary
sources to learn about the origins of the Constitution, but the past is
something we can only learn about and learn from, not learn per se.
The records are too incomplete, and the nature of lawmaking too
imprecise, to enable us to discover original meaning.
Id.
12
See Jeffrey Rosen, Moving On, THE NEW YORKER, Apr. 29 & May 6, 1996, at 73.
[Thomas] has shown little familiarity with the most recent scholarship
about Reconstruction Republicans and the limited scope of their colorblind vision. This scholarship, embraced by liberal and conservative
legal historians, suggests that Thomas is wrong to insist that the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution was intended to forbid
racial discrimination in all circumstances . . . . [I]n 1868, when the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, [the rights it included] were not
clearly understood to include the right to attend desegregated schools,
or the right to receive federal contracts, or the right to vote. Thomas is
trapped, in short, between his moral commitment to a color-blind
Constitution and an interpretative methodology that compels him to
reject it.
Id.
13
Graber, supra note 6, at 88.
14
Smith, supra note 9, at 48.
11
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organization in 2001, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.15 This was one of three related
cases heard by the Supreme Court. Another of the cases concerned
hundreds of non-U.S. citizens labeled as “unlawful combatants” and
placed in indefinite, incommunicado detention at the U.S. Naval base at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.16 The third case concerned an American
arrested inside the United States and held incommunicado at a military
jail.17
A. The Other Justices’ Opinions
Yaser Esam Hamdi grew up in Saudi Arabia and was captured in
Afghanistan by the Northern Alliance military forces, Taliban opponents
who cooperated with American personnel during fighting to take control
of the country.18 The U.S. government declared that Hamdi was an
“enemy combatant” and thereby ineligible for the legal protection that
the Geneva Conventions provide for soldiers in countries’ regular
armies.19 When placed in custody of American officials, Hamdi was sent
initially to the detention facility at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba; however, when it was discovered that he was a U.S. citizen
by virtue of being born in Louisiana during a time period when his
parents resided in the United States, he was transferred to a military jail
in South Carolina.20
The government claimed that the “enemy
combatant” label that it applied to Hamdi “justifies holding him in the
United States indefinitely—without formal charges or proceedings—
unless and until [the government] makes the determination that access to
counsel or further process is warranted.”21 Thus, the government
asserted that it had the authority to hold a U.S. citizen incommunicado
for an indefinite time period without the provision of any legal rights or
access to the courts.
Hamdi’s father filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and the
U.S. District Court appointed a federal public defender to represent
15
124 S. Ct. 2633, 2635 (2004). In the weeks following the terror attacks on September 11,
2001, against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the United States and allied
countries invaded Afghanistan after the Taliban government refused to act against al
Qaeda leaders living in their country. Julian Gearing, The Next Front, ASIA WEEK (Nov. 23,
2001), available at www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/magazine/dateline/0,8782,184614,00.
html.
16
Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2690 (2004).
17
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711, 2715 (2004).
18
Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2635.
19
Id. at 2636-38.
20
Id. at 2636.
21
Id.
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Hamdi and ordered that Hamdi be permitted to meet with the attorney.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed that decision
and order.22 When the case reached the United States Supreme Court, it
held “that although Congress authorized the detention of combatants in
the narrow circumstances alleged here, due process demands that a
citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant be given a
meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention
before a neutral decisionmaker.”23 Justice Sandra O’Connor’s plurality
opinion, joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justices Anthony
Kennedy and Stephen Breyer, announcing the judgment of the Court
noted “‘the risk of erroneous deprivation’ of a detainee’s liberty interest”
if the government were permitted to have absolute control over
determining a detainee’s status and preventing any contact with courts
and the outside world.24
Justice David Souter, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
concurred in part, dissented in part, and concurred in the judgment.25
The concurring opinion disagreed with O’Connor’s conclusion that the
Authorization for the Use of Military Force (“AUMF”), a resolution
passed by Congress after the terror attacks of September 11, 2001,
granted the government the authority to detain Hamdi.26 According to
Souter, “[t]he Government has failed to demonstrate that the Force
Resolution authorizes the detention complained of here even on the facts
the Government claims. If the Government raises nothing further than
the record now shows, the Non-Detention Act27 entitles Hamdi to be
released.”28 The Non-Detention Act states that “[n]o citizen shall be
imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant
to an Act of Congress.”29
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice John
Paul Stevens, argued that the government was obligated to prosecute
detained U.S. citizens for alleged crimes and accord them full legal
protections under the Bill of Rights.30 Justice Scalia, who agrees with

22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 2002).
Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2635.
Id. at 2648.
Id. at 2652 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 2653 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000) (citation added).
Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2653 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 2660 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Justice Thomas in most cases31 and who also advocates the importance of
the framers’ intentions,32 emphasized the value of liberty when he
concluded that “[t]he very core of liberty secured by our Anglo-Saxon
system of separated powers has been freedom from indefinite
imprisonment at the will of the Executive.”33 Justice Scalia noted that
The Federalist Papers quoted a famous passage from Blackstone that
demonstrated the central importance of individual liberty: “Of great
importance to the public is the preservation of this personal liberty: for if
once it were left in the power of any, the highest, magistrate to imprison
arbitrarily whomever he or his officers thought proper . . . there would
soon be an end of all other rights and immunities.”34
B. Justice Thomas’s Opinion
The three different opinions described in the foregoing section
indicate that the justices were divided in their assessments of the
appropriate reasoning for the issues presented by Hamdi. However, a
closer examination reveals that the eight justices involved in all three
opinions—plurality, concurring in part and dissenting in part, and
dissenting—agreed on the fundamental issue concerning Hamdi’s liberty
interest. All eight justices agreed that the executive branch lacks the
authority to hold U.S. citizens indefinitely in incommunicado detention
without any constitutional rights or access to the courts. By contrast,
Justice Thomas stood out all alone, in sharp contrast even with his usual
philosophical allies, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia,35 by
endorsing virtually unfettered executive authority to deprive U.S.
citizens of liberty indefinitely and without any proof of wrongdoing.
According to Thomas, Hamdi’s “detention falls squarely within the
Federal Government’s war powers, and we lack the expertise and
capacity to second-guess that decision.”36
Justice Thomas did not explicitly endorse inherent presidential
authority to detain American citizens indefinitely in all circumstances.
31
For example, Justices Scalia and Thomas agreed in more than ninety percent of the
Supreme Court’s civil rights and liberties decisions during Thomas’s first five terms on the
Court. Christopher E. Smith, Clarence Thomas: A Distinctive Justice, 28 SETON HALL L. REV.
1, 4 (1997).
32
See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989).
33
Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2661 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
34
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *132-33).
35
Empirical analyses of patterns in Supreme Court decision-making demonstrate that
Thomas agrees with Rehnquist and Scalia in various categories of cases at rates as high as
ninety percent. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 31, at 4.
36
Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2674 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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However, he did indicate his belief that “the President very well may
have inherent authority to detain those arrayed against our troops.”37
He saw the presidential power to detain individuals in this case as
flowing from the congressional enactment of the AUMF,38 which
authorized the president to “use all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks.”39 Thomas’s
position gave the four-member plurality (O’Connor, Rehnquist,
Kennedy, and Breyer) the needed fifth vote to justify the president’s
authority to detain individuals upon labeling them as enemy
combatants.40
Notwithstanding Thomas’s allusion to inherent
presidential authority to detain U.S. citizens,41 he relied on the AUMF as
the source of the president’s authority and, therefore by implication, as a
limitation on presidential power. Although arguably Thomas’s reliance
on AUMF is not an endorsement of plenary presidential authority to
detain U.S. citizens, as a practical matter Congress virtually always falls
into line with the president’s wishes when the executive asserts a need to
use American military power to counteract a perceived enemy.42 Under
Thomas’s vision of presidential authority in wartime eras and threats to
national security, judicial review, such as that requested by Hamdi

Id. at 2679 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“I agree with the plurality that we need not decide that
question because Congress has authorized the President to [detain those arrayed against
our troops through the Authorization for Use of Military Force]”).
39
Id. at 2635.
40
The justices concurring in part and dissenting in part (Ginsburg and Souter) and the
other dissenting justices (Scalia and Stevens) did not agree that the AUMF gave the
president the authority to undertake such detentions of American citizens. Id. at 2671
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Id. at 2653 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
41
See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
42
At the outset of the Vietnam War, for example:
[The United States] provoked the Tonkin Gulf incident of August 1964,
the clashes between torpedo boats of Hanoi’s navy and U.S. Navy
destroyers, which [President Lyndon] Johnson used to trick the Senate
into giving him an advance declaration of war for the far higher level
of force he had decided by then he was probably going to have to
employ to bend Hanoi to his will.
NEIL SHEEHAN, A BRIGHT SHINING LIE: JOHN PAUL VANN AND AMERICA IN VIETNAM 379
(1988). Although Congress enacted the War Powers Resolution after the Vietnam War in
an ostensible effort to prevent presidents from involving U.S. troops in hostilities without
congressional authorization, “[s]ome critics of the legislation claimed that it did not restrict
presidential power as much as extend a free hand to wage war for up to sixty days.”
KENNETH JANDA ET AL., THE CHALLENGE OF DEMOCRACY 645 (7th ed. 2002). As observers
note, “[t]he actual impact of the War Powers Resolution is probably quite minimal . . . .
[Presidents] have all questioned its constitutionality, and no president has ever been
punished for violating its provisions.” Id.
37
38
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concerning his detention, appears to be the only practical check on
assertions of power by the president. Because Thomas argues against
the existence or assertion of judicial power in such situations, his
position comes close to the endorsement of unfettered executive
authority.
Justice Thomas purported to rely on his originalist philosophy by
stating that “[t]he Founders intended that the President have primary
responsibility—along with the necessary power—to protect the national
security and to conduct the Nation’s foreign relations.”43 He linked this
deference to the executive’s discretionary authority in wartime to the
highest priority to be placed on the value of national security.44 His
opinion also emphasized the judiciary’s lack of capability to make
decisions concerning issues involved with national security45 and the
corresponding need for judges to show deference to decisions by
executive officials.46
When Thomas addressed the consistency of his positions with the
constitutional protection against being “deprived of . . . liberty . . .
without due process of law,”47 he effectively dismissed any practical
protections that could flow from the Due Process Clause by declaring:
In this context, due process requires nothing more than a
good-faith executive determination. To be clear: The
Court has held [in prior cases] that an executive, acting
pursuant to statutory and constitutional authority may,
consistent with the Due Process Clause, unilaterally
Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2675 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
According to Thomas’s opinion, “It is ‘obvious and unarguable’ that no governmental
interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.’” Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (quoting Aptheker v. Sec’y of State, 378 U.S.
500, 509 (1964)).
45
In Thomas’s words, “with respect to certain decisions relating to national security and
foreign affairs, the courts simply lack the relevant information and expertise to secondguess determinations made by the President based on information properly withheld.” Id.
at 2676 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
46
Even when Thomas sees a decision-making role for the judiciary, those decisions are
to be deferential. He has stated:
I acknowledge that the question whether Hamdi’s executive detention
is lawful is a question properly resolved by the Judicial Branch, though
the question comes to the Court with the strongest presumptions in
favor of the Government . . . . [W]e lack the information and expertise
to question whether Hamdi is actually an enemy combatant, a question
the resolution of which is committed to other branches.
Id. at 2678 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
47
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
43
44
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decide to detain an individual if the executive deems
this necessary for the public safety even if he is mistaken.48
Because Thomas would grant to the executive “an authority that
includes making virtually conclusive factual findings” about the need to
detain individuals,49 it is difficult to see how Thomas gives any weight to
the value of the liberty interest emphasized by the framers.50 Indeed, he
specifically declined to balance individuals’ liberty interests against the
national security claims put forward by the executive as part of his
analysis in the case.51 He only engaged in the exercise of undertaking a
balancing analysis as a means to refute the reasoning of the plurality
opinion after he had already stated his own conclusions about the
executive’s virtually unfettered authority. In undertaking this exercise,
he clearly states that executive claims about national security threats
trump any protections purported to exist in the Due Process Clause:
Undeniably, Hamdi has been deprived of a serious interest, one
actually protected by the Due Process Clause. Against this, however, is
the government’s overriding interest in protecting the nation. If a
deprivation of liberty can be justified by the need to protect a town, the
protection of the nation, a fortiori, justifies it.52
Although the foregoing statement purports to present how Thomas
would balance the interests at stake if he believed that a balancing test
was appropriate, his formulation does not accurately reflect the
implications of the analysis he articulated earlier in the opinion that
actually shaped his decision. His use of the word “justified” might be
perceived to imply that the executive is actually required to either
present persuasive evidence about the danger posed by a specific
individual or that the evidence presented must, in fact, be accurate in
identifying the individual as presenting a danger. In fact, neither

Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2680-81 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2680 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
50
See infra text accompanying notes 124-143.
51
Thomas stated:
I conclude that the Government’s detention of Hamdi as an enemy
combatant does not violate the Constitution. By detaining Hamdi, the
President, in the prosecution of a war and authorized by Congress, has
acted well within his authority. Hamdi thereby received all the
process to which he was due under the circumstances. I therefore
believe that this is no occasion to balance the competing interests, as
the plurality unconvincingly attempts to do.
Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. 2683 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
52
Id. at 2685 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
48
49
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implication need be true according to the analysis presented by Thomas.
Hamdi’s detention was justified by the government through the Mobbs
Declaration, a recitation of statements by a Special Advisor to the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy alleging that Hamdi “affiliated with a
Taliban military unit and received weapons training.”53 Moreover,
Thomas had already indicated that it did not matter whether these
unsubstantiated statements were true.54
Thus, a more accurate
paraphrasing of Thomas’s conclusion would be as follows: “If a
deprivation of liberty can be rationalized by untested and
unsubstantiated statements by the Government, an indefinite,
incommunicado detention is permissible, whether or not those justifying
statements were accurate.” Clearly, Thomas’s analysis gave scant
attention to the framers’ emphasis on individual liberty in the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights.
III. CONSISTENCY
More so than any other contemporary justice, “Thomas consistently
advocates the strict application of key tools for interpreting the
Constitution: its text and history.”55 He sees himself as a principled
decision maker with a consistent, coherent judicial philosophy.56
Because Thomas seeks to distinguish himself from “the other justices
[who] appear to engage in ad hoc decision making as they react to the
legal issues that confront them in each individual case,”57 his opinions
invite analysis regarding consistency and contradictions. This section
will examine whether Thomas’s opinion in the Hamdi case is consistent
with his judicial philosophy and his reasoning in prior cases.
A. Philosophical Orientation Toward Diminishing Judicial Activity and
Power
Justice Thomas emphasized that judges lack the capability to
determine whether Hamdi should be labeled as an “enemy combatant,”“
and therefore, the judiciary should step aside in order to permit other
branches of government to handle matters related to national security.58
This denigration of judicial capacity and desire for a diminution of
judicial activity are consistent with his underlying belief that the

53
54
55
56
57
58
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judiciary “exercises excessive power,” and thus “he “seeks to restore the
democratic equilibrium that, in his view, the Constitution’s Framers
intended.”59
Indeed, this philosophical orientation underlies his
advocacy of originalism because he “believes that fidelity to text and
history will keep judges faithful to the law and prevent them from
imposing their personal values on society.”60 Justice Thomas emphasized
this theme in other decisions, including his implicit criticism of judges’
excessive intrusion into public policy when he attacked a prisoners’
rights opinion as “yet another manifestation of the pervasive view that
the Federal Constitution must address all ills in our society.”61
B. Purported Adherence to Legal Principle Without Regard for Social Reality
1.

Thomas and Social Reality

Because Thomas aspires to follow a principled judicial philosophy of
constitutional interpretation by original intent, he has been described as
“a voice for a formal, even rigid approach to constitutional
interpretation, a rejection of the idea that modern influences might cast a
new light on the intentions of the Framers.”62 While other justices
frequently indicate that the potential consequences of their decisions on
people’s lives can influence their analysis of issues,63 Thomas insists that
the Court is “bound by the text of the Constitution and by the intent of
those who drafted and ratified it.”64 With respect to constitutional rights,
for example, Thomas says:

Smith, supra note 9, at 50.
Id.
61
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 28 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
62
David J. Garrow, On Race, It’s Thomas v. An Old Ideal, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1995, at E1.
63
For example, with respect to the applicability of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
on cruel and unusual punishment to convicted offenders in prison, Thomas states flatly
that the framers “simply did not conceive of the Eighth Amendment as protecting inmates
from harsh treatment.” Hudson, 505 U.S. at 19-20 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Therefore, he
espouses the idea that the Eighth Amendment should not even be used to examine
conditions of confinement. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). By contrast, other justices, such as
Justice Stevens, emphasize looking at the social reality of prison conditions in order to
determine whether they are “cruel and unusual” under the Eighth Amendment. For
example, in examining conditions in isolation cells at an Arkansas prison, Justice Stevens
focused on aspects of actual conditions: “It is equally plain, however, that the length of
confinement cannot be ignored in deciding whether the confinement meets constitutional
standards. A filthy, overcrowded cell and a diet of ‘grue’ might be tolerable for a few days
and intolerably cruel for weeks and months.” Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686-87 (1978).
64
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 370-71 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
59
60
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It is a bedrock principle of judicial restraint that a right
be lodged firmly in the text or tradition of a specific
constitutional provision before we will recognize it as
fundamental. Strict adherence to this approach is
essential if we are to fulfill our constitutionally assigned
role of giving full effect to the mandate of the Framers
without infusing the constitutional fabric with our own
political views.65
As one manifestation of his aspiration to create principled decisions
based entirely on the words and original intent of the Constitution,
Thomas castigates the use of social science evidence by judges in making
decisions.66 Social science attempts to use scientific methods to describe
and analyze social reality,67 including counting and classifying
observable objects and phenomena,68 in order to gain “an empirically
based understanding”69 of people and the world in which they live.
According to Thomas, “[t]he lower courts should not be swayed by the
easy answers of social science, nor should they accept the findings, and
the assumptions, of sociology and psychology at the price of
constitutional principle.”70
The foregoing description of Thomas’s aspirations for judicial
decision making should not be perceived to mean that he never takes
facts into account in making decisions. In supporting an individual’s
claim about a violation of the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines
Clause, the amount of money in question was apparently relevant to
Thomas’s decision since the framers did not give adequate guidance on
the definition of the word “excessive.”71 Indeed, Thomas sometimes
attempts to influence decisions by putting forth his own conclusions
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 367 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring).
For example, in considering an equal protection issue, Thomas wrote that “[t]he
judiciary is fully competent to make independent determinations concerning the existence
of state action without the unnecessary and misleading assistance of the social sciences.”
Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 121 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
67
The collection of data in social science is based primarily on observation, experiments,
and surveys. See STEVEN VAGO, LAW AND SOCIETY 292-305 (3d ed. 1991).
68
For example, the quantitative methods in social science can facilitate the collection of
data so that it is comprehensive, precise, efficient, and reliable. THOMAS R. HENSLEY ET AL.,
THE CHANGING SUPREME COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 866 (1997).
69
RICHARD LEMPERT & JOSEPH SANDERS, AN INVITATION TO LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 1
(1986).
70
Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 122-23 (Thomas, J., concurring).
71
United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 335 (1998) (involving a traveler at an
international airport who forfeited $357,000 in cash being carried in a suitcase for failing to
file a form declaring the transportation of the cash out of the country).
65
66
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about social reality, even though his conclusions may be either
unsubstantiated by evidence72 or demonstrably incorrect.73 As indicated
by these examples, Thomas is not completely consistent in rejecting
considerations of social reality. However, because he emphasizes the
principle of fealty to original intent, he often disregards the practical
consequences of decisions, and therefore his refusal to acknowledge or
consider the potential impact of his conclusions in the Hamdi case is
consistent with his approach to judicial decision-making.
2.

The Risk of Error in Choosing Individuals for Indefinite Detention

In the Hamdi case, Thomas’ gave scant attention to any aspects of
social reality that might raise concerns about practical risks to
individuals from indefinite, incommunicado detention based on the
government’s discretionary decisions. Thomas purports to rely on facts
in characterizing the government’s actions as “detaining an enemy
soldier” in order to “gather critical intelligence regarding the intentions
and capabilities of our adversaries.”74 Yet Thomas does not require the
government to substantiate its claim that the individual is, in fact, an
enemy soldier and, moreover, Thomas would permit indefinite
detentions even when the government wrongly labeled an American as
an enemy.75
After the government labeled detained individuals as “unlawful
combatants” and began to send them from Afghanistan to Guantanamo
Bay,76 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld justified their
72
Thomas has asserted, for example, without any supporting evidence that it can be
“reasonably surmised, without direct evidence in any particular case, that all-white juries
might judge black defendants unfairly.” Georgia v. McCullom, 505 U.S. 42, 61 (1992)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
73
With respect to the currently outlawed practice of mandatory death sentences for firstdegree murder and other crimes, Thomas has said, “One would think, however, that by
eliminating explicit jury discretion and treating all defendants equally, a mandatory death
penalty scheme was a perfectly reasonable legislative response to the concerns [about racial
discrimination and arbitrariness] expressed in Furman.” Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461,
487 (1993) (referring to Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)). Social science knowledge
about judicial processes indicates, however, that mandatory sentences cannot eliminate
racial discrimination because prosecutors still possess discretion to determine which
defendants will be charged with capital crimes, juries possess discretion about whether to
convict or, sometimes, find guilt for a lesser offense, and judges make discretionary
decisions about evidentiary issues, jury selection, and other matters that can make similarly
situated cases produce divergent results. Christopher E. Smith, The Supreme Court and
Ethnicity, 69 OR. L. REV. 797, 830 (1990).
74
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2683 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
75
See supra text accompanying notes 48-50.
76
CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: MYTHS & REALITIES 197 (2004).
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incommunicado detentions by characterizing them as “people [who]
were involved in an effort to kill thousands of Americans . . . . These are
very tough, hard-core, well-trained terrorists.”77 Brigadier General
Michael Lehnert, the commander of the Guantanmo Bay prison, labeled
the detainees as “the worst of the worst.”78 Despite these drastic,
categorical declarations reflecting the government’s labeling and
treatment of suspected terrorists, by the time that the Supreme Court
decided the Hamdi case in 2004, the government had released at least 119
of these supposedly “hard-core, well-trained terrorists.”79 It turned out
that dozens of these individuals who were detained without rights for
two years were not Taliban soldiers and had actually been kidnapped by
warlords in Afghanistan who told Americans officials that these
individuals were supporters of the Taliban or al Qaeda in order to collect
bounty money from the U.S. government.80 Despite this available
information about the fallibility of the government’s judgments
concerning suspected terrorists, Thomas would grant the executive
unlimited authority to undertake mistaken detentions without any
possibility of judicial review and correction.
The hyperbolic nature of the government’s statements about
detainees became even clearer within months after the Supreme Court’s
Hamdi decision when the government released Hamdi and deported him
to Saudi Arabia rather than participating in any judicial processes to
justify his detention.81 Hamdi’s release conveyed the impression that the
drastic characterizations about the need to hold him in incommunicado
detention and the government’s dogged determination to fight the case
through every level of the federal court system had more to do with the
desire to gain judicial endorsement of unfettered executive power than
with any actual danger that Hamdi posed to the United States.

77
U.S. Department of Defense News Transcript, Secretary Rumsfeld Media Stakeout at
NBC, Jan. 20, 2002, available at www.dod.mil/transcripts/2002/t01222002_t0120so.html.
78
Esther Schrader, Response to Terror; Base Awaits ‘the Worst of the Worst,’ L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 10, 2002, available at http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/latimes/99034514.html.
79
Int’l Information Programs, U.S. Department of State, Defense Department Releases 26
More Detainees from Guantanamo, Mar. 16, 2004, available at usinfo.state.gov/dhr/Archive/
2004/Mar/17-436215.html.
80
Nancy Gibbs & Viveca Novak, Inside “‘The Wire,’” TIME, Dec. 8, 2003, available at
http://www.time.com/time/archive/preview/0,10987,1006372,00.html.
81
Jerry Markon, Hamdi Returned to Saudi Arabia; U.S. Citizen’s Detention as Enemy
Combatant Sparked Fierce Debate, THE WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 12, 2004, at A02.
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Incommunicado Detention and the Risk of Torture

The practical risks of unlimited executive authority were also
illustrated by oral arguments in the Hamdi case and events that followed
soon after it. Incommunicado detention is not merely a threat to
individual liberty; it also raises risks that the government will employ
torture or impose inhumane conditions of confinement.82 Indeed, the
United States has been hiding nearly two dozen high-profile terrorism
suspects from the International Committee of the Red Cross at
undisclosed overseas locations, apparently so that no one can learn about
the interrogation techniques and conditions of confinement being
applied to these individuals who are believed to possess valuable
information.83 During oral arguments, Paul D. Clement, the deputy
solicitor general, responded to Justice Anthony Kennedy’s question of
whether the government could punish or shoot detainees since the
government claims that these individuals are not entitled to any rights in
part by saying, “We couldn’t take somebody like Hamdi, for example,
now that he’s been removed from the battlefield and is completely—
poses no threat unless he’s released, and use that kind of force on him.”84
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg subsequently asked:
“Suppose the
executive says, ‘“Mild torture, we think, will help to get this
information?’” It’s not a soldier who does something against the code of
military justice, but it’s an executive command. Some systems do that to
get information.”85
In response to the query from Ginsburg, Clement said, “Well, our
executive doesn’t [use torture],” and he later added, “[T]he fact that
executive discretion in a war situation can be abused is not a good and
sufficient reason for judicial micromanagement and overseeing that
authority . . . . [Y]ou have to trust the executive to make the kind of
quintessential judgments that are involved in things like that.”86

82
Indeed, evidence emerged that the United States employed torture techniques in
attempting to gain information from some terrorism suspects, such as “waterboarding”
subjects by thrusting them headfirst into water and holding them there so that they believe
they will drown. Suzanne Goldenberg, U.S. Forces Were Taught Torture Techniques, THE
GUARDIAN, May 14, 2004, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/
0,3604,1216438,00.html.
83
Jon Manel, U.S. Hides High-Profile Prisoners, BBC NEWS, May 21, 2004, available at
news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/americas/3736157.stm.
84
Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court Asks: Who Will Guard the Guardians?, N.Y.
TIMES, May 9, 2004, § 4, at 7.
85
Id.
86
Id.
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A few hours after Clement denied that the government uses torture,
the CBS program 60 Minutes II broadcast footage of Iraqi detainees in
Abu Ghraib prison being humiliated and abused by American military
personnel.87 Stories and pictures about abuses at Abu Ghraib dominated
television and newspaper stories in the weeks that followed and were
undoubtedly seen by the justices at the Supreme Court.88 In addition, as
the justices drafted their opinions before issuing the Hamdi decision on
June 28, 2004, news reports revealed that attorneys in the Justice
Department’s Office of Legal Counsel had sent the White House memos
saying that the use of torture on suspected terrorists “may be justified”
and that international laws against torture “may be unconstitutional.”89
The memos define interrogation methods as constituting torture only
when they cause extreme harms, such the infliction of pain equivalent in
intensity to “severe physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of
bodily function, or even death” or psychological harm that lasts for
“months or even years.”90 This definition permits significantly more
harsh and painful interrogation methods than those permitted under the
definitions of torture in international law, such as the United Nations
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel or Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment.91 News reports also revealed that the CIA
had used these memos as the basis for approving more aggressive
interrogation techniques by its agents.92 In sum, at the same time that
the lawyers representing the government before the Supreme Court
denied that the executive branch would participate in the torture of
detainees, other lawyers advising the president were endorsing just such
actions, and these endorsements apparently contributed to the use of
torturous interrogation techniques that violate international law.93

Warren Richey, When Do News Reports Influence Those in Black Robes?, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (Jul. 7, 2004), available at www.csmonitor.com/2004/0707/p02s02-usju.html.
88
Id.
89
Mike Allen & Dana Priest, Memo on Torture Draws Focus to Bush, WASH. POST, Jun. 9,
2004, at A03.
90
Id.
91
See Association for the Prevention of Torture Paper, Compilation Under International
Law: Definition of Torture, May 11, 2001, available at www.apt.ch/un/definition.shtml
(“‘[T]orture’ means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental,
is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third
person information or a confession.”).
92
Allen & Priest, supra note 89, at A03.
93
See, e.g., The Torture Memos Series: Editorials, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jun. 13, 2004, at 2P,
available at http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/sptimes/650526751.html (“But an everexpanding body of evidence shows that the president, vice president, defense secretary and
attorney general sought ways to defend the use of abusive tactics on the part of American
87
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Observers speculated that the availability of information about
American complicity in torture and its stark refutation of the
government’s claims that it could be trusted to treat detainees in a
proper and humane fashion might affect the justices’ assessment of
Hamdi’s case and the attendant risks of indefinite incommunicado
detention.94 After all of the news reports on torture during the Court’s
deliberation period, “in the end, only one justice, Clarence Thomas, fully
embraced the administration’s ‘trust us’ argument.”95 Justice Thomas’s
position in the Hamdi case provides further evidence of his desire to
exclude any consideration of the practical consequences of judicial
decisions on actual human beings, no matter how torturous those
consequences may be.
4.

The Infinite Duration of the “War” on Terrorism

Justice Thomas also implies the potential existence of a practical
limitation on the executive power endorsed by his opinion through
characterizing the power as existing “in the war context.”96 However,
this qualifying phrase provides no realistic limitation on the extent and
duration of executive power, as noted by one commentator:
The war on terrorism is being waged against a hidden
enemy who is not going to surrender in a ceremony
aboard the USS Missouri. There is indeed no way to
foresee how or when this war will end. The fear of
terrorism may well go on for the rest of our lives.97
Moreover, Thomas also indicates that he would take a broad,
deferential view of the circumstances that justify detentions, and he
would not tie the president’s power to the continuation of active military
actions:
[T]he plurality relies primarily on Article 118 of the
Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War . . . for the proposition that “[i]t is a
clearly established principle of the law of war that
detention may last no longer than active hostilities.” It
military personnel and intelligence agents that violate international law and American
tradition.”).
94
See Richey, supra note 87.
95
Id.
96
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2684 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
97
Anthony Lewis, Security and Liberty: Preserving the Values of Freedom, in THE WAR ON
OUR FREEDOMS 50-51 (Richard C. Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr., eds., 2003).
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then appears to limit the President’s authority to detain
by requiring that the record establis[h] that United States
troops are still involved in active combat in Afghanistan
because, in that case, detention would be “part of the
exercise of ‘necessary and appropriate force.’” But I do
not believe that we may diminish the Federal
Government’s war powers by reference to a
treaty . . . . [W]e are bound by the political branches’
determination that the United States is at war . . . . And,
in any case, the power to detain does not end with the
cessation of formal hostilities.98
Thus, in Thomas’s view, the duration of the extensive powers of the
president during wartime, including the power to detain American
citizens without any access to the courts, is defined by Congress and the
president, regardless of practical circumstances concerning the existence
of active combat or other military operations.
5.

Unfettered Wartime Authority and the Lessons of History

Although Thomas presents himself as relying on history in his
approach to constitutional interpretation,99 his Hamdi opinion evinces
little recognition of the realities of American history. The United States
has repeatedly experienced wartime episodes in which the government
asserted the authority to override the liberty and rights of individuals in
the name of national security.100 However, retrospective analyses of

Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2679 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Smith, supra note 9, at 48.
100
See Geoffrey R. Stone, Justices Who Won’t “‘Run with the Wolves,”‘ L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15,
2004, at B9.
In time of war, Americans have too often responded to fear and
anxiety by harshly restricting constitutional liberties.
At the end of the [eighteenth] century, for example, when the
nation faced the threat of war with France, the government enacted the
Sedition Act of 1798, which effectively made it a crime for any person
to criticize the president, Congress or government of the United States.
During the Civil War, President Lincoln repeatedly suspended
the writ of habeas corpus, allowing as many as 38,000 individuals to be
seized and imprisoned by military authorities without any recourse to
judicial review.
During World War I, the government enacted the Espionage Act
of 1917 and the Sedition Act of 1918 to quell antiwar dissent. More
than 2,000 opponents of the war were prosecuted.
In World War II, the United States interned nearly 120,000 people
of Japanese descent, 90,000 of whom were American citizens,
98
99
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governmental actions against Japanese-Americans during World War II,
the Cold War period of McCarthyism, or other “wars” consistently lead
to the following conclusion: “[T]he history of civil liberties in times of
emergency suggests that governments seldom react to crises carefully
and judiciously. They acquiesce to the most alarmist proponents of
repression.”101 Justice Thomas rejects considerations of social reality in
favor of judicial decision making based on legal principles,102 but his
approach simultaneously blinds him to the practical implications of
history and the potential impact of his principles on the lives of his
fellow Americans.
Justice Thomas’s lack of consideration for the practical risks and
problems of his Hamdi opinion is consistent with his espoused approach
to constitutional interpretation that focuses on purported constitutional
principles rather than social reality. However, the nature of the risks and
problems attendant to this view, such as erroneous detentions, torture,
and perpetual unfettered executive authority in a “war” without end,
highlight the potential for significant adverse consequences for many
people if the Court had followed Thomas’s formalistic approach.
C. Disregard for the Treatment and Fates of Individuals Held in Custody
As indicated by the previous discussion of risks of erroneous
detentions and torture,103 Thomas’s opinion in Hamdi showed little
concern for the fates and treatment of individuals detained by executive
fiat. His opinions in cases concerning convicted criminal offenders
removing them from their homes and relocating them in crude
concentration camps.
During the Cold War, the U.S., fearful of Soviet espionage and
sabotage, fell into a mindless witch hunt implemented through brutal
legislative investigations, pervasive blacklists and criminal
prosecutions.
During the Vietnam War, the government aggressively infiltrated
antiwar organizations to disrupt and neutralize the antiwar
movement. The FBI compiled files on more than half a million
Americans purely because of their opposition to the nation’s policy in
Vietnam.
Id.
Alan Brinkley, A Familiar Story: Lessons from Past Assaults on Freedoms, in THE WAR ON
OUR FREEDOMS 45 (Richard C. Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr. eds., 2003).
102
For example, Thomas has criticized courts’ utilizing social science research concerning
the detrimental impacts of racial segregation because he believes judicial decisions should
rest entirely on legal principles. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 114 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (“This approach not only relies upon questionable social science research
rather than constitutional principle . . . .”).
103
See supra text accompanying notes 48-50 and 75-81.
101
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demonstrate a parallel absence of concern for individuals incarcerated in
the American criminal justice system.104 In applying his original intent
philosophy to the Eighth Amendment, Thomas says that the framers
“simply did not conceive of the Eighth Amendment as protecting
inmates from harsh treatment.”105 Thomas reiterated the point in
writing:
At a minimum, I believe that the original meaning of
“punishment,” the silence in the historical record, and
the 185 years of uniform precedent shift the burden of
persuasion to those who would apply the Eighth
Amendment to prison conditions. In my view, that
burden has not yet been discharged.106
Thus Thomas and Scalia have been the lone dissenters in cases in
which the other justices, including their usual philosophical ally Chief
Justice William Rehnquist, found in favor of prisoners’ Eighth
Amendment claims.107 Indeed, Thomas argues, by implication, that
prisoners should not even be granted a limited constitutional entitlement
to medical care in prison when he says that he “seriously doubts”108 that
the precedent establishing prisoners’ limited right was decided

For example, two of the Court’s other conservative justices, Justices O’Connor and
Kennedy, joined the majority’s opinion in Hope v. Pelzer by declaring that Alabama
corrections officials lost any claim to qualified immunity when their conduct constituted an
obvious violation of the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause by
chaining a prisoner to a hitching post in the prison yard. 536 U.S. 730, 731-32 (2002).
According to the facts recounted by the Court:
The guards made him take off his shirt, and he remained shirtless all
day while the sun burned his skin. He remained attached to the post
for approximately seven hours. During the 7-hour period, he was
given water only once or twice and was given no bathroom breaks. At
one point, a guard taunted Hope about his thirst. According to Hope’s
affidavit: “[The guard] first gave water to some dogs, then brought the
water cooler closer to me, removed its lid, and kicked the cooler over,
spilling the water onto the ground.”
Id. at 734-35. In his dissenting opinion arguing for qualified immunity to block a civil
rights lawsuit by the prisoner, Thomas said, “[T]he Eighth Amendment violation in this
case is far from ‘obvious.’” Id. at 751 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
105
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
106
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 40 (1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
107
See, e.g., Hudson, 503 U.S. at 4 (prisoner beaten by corrections officers permitted to sue
for Eighth Amendment violation despite the lack of a serious injury); Helling, 509 U.S. at 35
(non-smoking prisoner placed in a small cell with a chain-smoking cellmate permitted to
raise claim about potential health threat from environmental exposure to tobacco smoke).
108
Helling, 509 U.S. at 37 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
104
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correctly.109
Thomas’s position with respect to medical care is
problematic with respect to human consequences because “for prisoners,
who, by virtue of their incarceration, could not obtain such services for
themselves, . . . the deprivation of medical care can inflict pain and, in
worst-case situations, lead to ‘physical torture or a lingering death.’”110
Consistent with his view that Hamdi was not entitled to have access
to the courts, Thomas is among the justices who has sought to limit
access to habeas corpus for convicted offenders in American prisons. In
a case raising the issue of federal judges’ obligation to defer to state court
findings rather than conduct de novo reviews in habeas corpus cases,111
Thomas wrote the plurality opinion that was interpreted by scholars to
“conclud[e] that the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas and Scalia would
now adopt a deference rule for all the issues in habeas corpus cases.”112
Even more revealing of Thomas’s desire to limit effective judicial review
of prisoners’ cases was his opinion in McFarland v. Scott.113 Prior
Supreme Court decisions emphasized that prisoners must file all of their
claims in a single habeas petition and they cannot file successive
petitions based on the discovery of new claims.114 Under a federal
statute, capital defendants are entitled to legal representation in any
“post conviction proceeding.”115 The majority of justices in McFarland
said that such defendants can request counsel under the statute prior to
filing their habeas petition in order to have professional assistance in
preparing their one permitted petition containing constitutional
claims.116 By contrast, Thomas’s dissenting opinion asserted that the
Court was obligated to follow a literal interpretation of the statute,
which, according to Thomas, Scalia, and Rehnquist, would require the
prisoner to prepare and file the habeas petition on his own first, and
request representation by counsel later.117 Many prisoners suffer from

Prisoners’ limited entitlement to medical care is merely a right to not have prison
officials be “deliberately indifferent” to “serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 106 (1976). This right does not constitute an entitlement to good, prompt, or
complete medical care. See CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, LAW AND CONTEMPORARY CORRECTIONS
64-71, 208-214.
110
SMITH, supra note 109, at 210.
111
Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277 (1992).
112
Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L REV. 2331, 2394 (1993).
113
512 U.S. 849, 864-73 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
114
See, e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991).
115
21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) (2000).
116
McFarland, 512 U.S. at 858.
117
Id. at 866 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“In short, the terms of § 848(q)(4)(B) indicate that
Congress intended that legal assistance be made available under the provision only after a
habeas proceeding has been commenced by the filing of an application for habeas relief.”).
109
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educational deficiencies, problems of literacy, and mental illnesses, and
almost no prisoners have formal training in law.118 Thomas would
effectively require that inadequate, doomed pro se petitions be filed
before the provision of counsel, thereby assuring that potentially valid
claims would be lost due to the rule against successive petitions. In
capital cases, the loss of valid constitutional claims could obviously have
the most severe possible impact on the life of the incarcerated individual.
IV. CONTRADICTIONS
Because Thomas aspires to make principled decisions by using the
strict application of the Constitution’s text and history,119 he would
appear to be better positioned to demonstrate consistency in his decision
making than would “the other justices [who] appear to engage in ad hoc
decision making.”120 Although many aspects of his Hamdi opinion are
consistent with his other decisions, as indicated by the previous
discussion, Thomas is not always completely consistent.121 Moreover,
his Hamdi opinion includes elements that appear to clearly contradict his
espoused philosophy and approach to decision-making.
A. Liberty in the Constitution
Thomas effectively rejects the larger principles underlying the
Constitution concerning limited governmental power and the protection
of individual liberty. As described by Stephen Schulhofer,
The central premise of government under law is that
executive officials, no matter how well intentioned,
cannot be allowed unreviewable power imprison a
citizen . . . . However much we respect the good
intentions of the current attorney general and secretary
of defense, such disregard for traditional checks and
118

For example, in Florida’s prisons, more than fifty percent of the
inmates were found to read at or below the sixth grade level . . . .
Furthermore, in several states, there are significant proportions of
inmates who are not fluent in English . . . . A prisoner who has college
level reading ability would still not be able to utilize a law library
effectively without extensive training and experience in legal research
and procedure.
Christopher E. Smith, Examining the Boundaries of Bounds: Prison Law Libraries and Access to
the Courts, 30 HOW. L. J. 27, 34-35 (1987).
119
Smith, supra note 9, at 48.
120
Id.
121
See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
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balances is a recipe for bad mistakes and serious abuses
of power.122
Schulhofer characterizes limited government and individual rights,
the concepts that are effectively rejected by Thomas’s opinion, as the
“bedrock constitutional principles.”123
Individual liberty stands out as a central value of the framers. This
value did not merely inspire Patrick Henry’s famous declaration “give
me liberty, or give me death.”124 It also sparked the initiation of the
Revolutionary War125 and found expression in the country’s founding
documents, including the Declaration of Independence’s prominent
inclusion of liberty among people’s “inherent and unalienable rights.”126
In the words of legal historian Kermit Hall, “[t]he framers of the
Constitution in 1787 worried incessantly about protecting liberty from
encroaching governmental power . . . .”127 The founders of the United
States were significantly influenced by the writings of various
philosophers, such as John Locke, who “saw government—any
government—as by nature hostile to liberty, and argued therefore that it
should survive only on the tolerance of those whom it governed.”128
Moreover, the founders, viewing themselves and their values as
products of English history, saw their efforts as the continuation and
preservation of a “tradition of liberty [that] stretched back to at least
1215, when the English barons had forced King John to sign the Magna
Cara or Greater Charter.”129
The Preamble to the U.S. Constitution states the objective of
“secur[ing] the Blessings of Liberty for ourselves and our Posterity” as a
primary goal of the new governing system.130 Liberty is given special
emphasis and importance in the Preamble because “it is only with
Stephen J. Schulhofer, No Checks, No Balances: Discarding Bedrock Constitutional
Principles, in THE WAR ON OUR FREEDOMS 98 (Richard C. Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr. eds. 2003).
123
See Schulhofer, supra note 122, at 74.
124
Patrick Henry, Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death (Mar. 23, 1775), available at
www.law.ou.edu/hist/henry.html.
125
See, e.g., JANDA ET AL., supra note 42, at 60. (“The taxation [without representation]
issue became secondary [to the American colonists]; more important was the conflict
between British demands for order and American demands for liberty.”).
126
THOMAS JEFFERSON, THOMAS JEFFERSON ON DEMOCRACY 13 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1939).
127
Kermit L. Hall, Framing the Bill of Rights, in BY AND FOR THE PEOPLE: CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 17 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1991).
128
MELVIN UROFSKY, A MARCH OF LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 43 (1988).
129
Hall, supra note 127, at 14.
130
U.S. CONST. pmbl.
122
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respect to liberty that a concern is explicitly indicated for ‘our Posterity’
as well as for ‘ourselves.’”131 Thus, liberty appears to be such an
important value to the framers that “it seems to be something that
people can believe they have a duty to preserve not only for themselves
but also for those who follow them.”132
Elsewhere in the original Constitution, the framers devoted scant
discussion to protections for individuals.133 Despite the presence of very
few references to individuals’ rights, the Constitution states specifically
that “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
Safety may require it.”134 This emphasis reflects a clear desire to protect
individuals’ liberty by preventing arbitrary, incommunicado detentions
and making access to the courts available to detainees.135 Scholars have
described habeas corpus as “the Great Writ of Liberty—the means by
which English courts could enforce the ‘law of the land’ against
governmental power.”136 Despite expressing opposition to the creation
of a Bill of Rights, Alexander Hamilton emphasized that habeas corpus,
along with the prohibitions on ex post facto laws and titles of nobility,
“are perhaps greater securities to liberty and republicanism” than any
other specific rights in state constitutions.137 Although the framers’
initial inclination was to adopt Alexander Hamilton’s view that the
Constitution did not need a written Bill of Rights,138 they were
sufficiently concerned about the liberty interests at stake in the
government’s power to detain individuals that they placed the Habeas
Suspension Clause in Article I of the Constitution to emphasize the

GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787: A COMMENTARY 15 (1989).
Id.
133
The Bill of Rights was later added to the original Constitution because of critics’
concerns about the absence of specifically articulated protections for individuals in the
nation’s foundational document. HENSLEY ET AL., supra note 68, at 95.
134
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
135
As described by Malcolm Feeley and Edward Rubin, “Habeas corpus, a venerable
English writ, had evolved during the seventeenth century into a means by which courts
could review the legality of a prisoner’s confinement and order release in appropriate
circumstances.” MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND
THE MODERN STATE 31 (1998).
136
Yackle, supra note 112, at 2337.
137
THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 435 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Wills ed., 1982).
138
See id. at 437 (“I go further, and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and in the extent
in which they are contended for, are not only unnecessary in the proposed constitution, but
would even be dangerous.”).
131
132
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existence of a protection against detentions undertaken on arbitrary or
otherwise inappropriate bases.139
The first amendments added to the Constitution as the Bill of Rights
“concretely articulated the Constitution’s aim of securing personal
liberty.”140 Within these amendments, there are many examples of
specific legal protections established to protect aspects of liberty. For
example, the Fifth Amendment seeks to protect against compelled selfincrimination141 and against deprivations of life, liberty, or property
imposed by the federal government without due process of law.142 The
Sixth Amendment rights concerning criminal prosecutions impose
various procedural requirements, including rights to trial, confrontation,
and counsel, as a means to prevent arbitrary and unfair deprivations of
liberty for people facing the prospect of punishment.143
In light of this evidence of the importance of liberty as a preeminent
value for the framers of the Constitution, one might expect Justice
Thomas, the foremost advocate of fealty to the framers’ intentions, to be
one of liberty’s greatest defenders in light of his outspoken advocacy of
constitutional interpretation by original intent. In fact, however,
Thomas’s opinion completely overrides the framers’ emphasis on
individual liberty by treating executive authority and claims of national
security threats as the preeminent and nearly exclusive priorities.
B. Hamdi , the Constitution, and the Framers’ Intent
Thomas’s opinion in Hamdi looked for evidence of original intent
and also cited the text of the Constitution. However, the nature and
strength of that evidence cast doubt on whether it genuinely supports
Thomas’s absolutist endorsement of executive authority.
The textual aspect of the Constitution cited by Thomas144 is Article
II’s designation of the president as “the Commander in Chief of the

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIL IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY
135 (1997).
141
U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that none “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself . . . .”).
142
Id. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies against the states,
but the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies only against the federal
government. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 301 (1993).
143
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
144
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2533, 2675 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
139
140
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Army and Navy.”145 This phrase, by itself, does not clearly convey an
intention to grant to the president the authority to hold American
citizens in indefinite, incommunicado detention on U.S. soil, so Thomas
explained his reliance on the phrase through Supreme Court precedents
concerning presidential power.146 Thomas brought forth language from
prior opinions that speak about broad presidential power in time of war
and perceived national security risks, such as Justice Robert Jackson’s
1940’s era comment that “[i]t would be intolerable that courts, without
the relevant information, should review and perhaps nullify actions of
the Executive taken on information properly held secret.”147 Such
reliance on precedent is awkward for Thomas because he repeatedly
emphasizes that constitutional interpretation should rely on the text and
the framers’ intent;148 this approach frequently leads Thomas to reject
precedents and, in effect, advocate radical changes or wholesale
reversals of established doctrines.149 Moreover, the author of a Thomas
biography project, with which the justice cooperated, quotes Justice
Scalia, who frequently joins Thomas’s opinions, as saying that Thomas
“doesn’t believe in stare decisis, period. If a constitutional line of
authority is wrong, [Thomas] would say, let’s get it right.”150
Meanwhile, Scalia says of himself, “I wouldn’t do that.”151 Thus, there is
a question about whether Thomas’s efforts to use case precedent to
support the limited textual reference available in the Constitution is
actually consistent with his judicial philosophy and his usual method of
interpretation.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2676-77 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Prize Cases, 67 U.S.
635 (1862); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678 (1981) and citing United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)).
147
Chi. & S. Air Lines Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948).
148
See supra text accompanying notes 8-10.
149
For example, Thomas endorses tossing aside seven decades of Commerce Clause
jurisprudence in order to return to the late nineteenth century’s limitations on
congressional power. CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH & JOYCE A. BAUGH, THE REAL CLARENCE
THOMAS: CONFIRMATION VERACITY MEETS PERFORMANCE REALITY 155-56 (2000). Justice
Thomas also asserts the novel idea that there would be no Establishment Clause violation if
a state established an official religion. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S.
Ct. 2301, 2327-33 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). This assertion flies in the
face of the Court’s precedents going back for more than four decades. See HENSLEY ET AL.,
supra note 68, at 130-91. Justice Thomas appears eager to reverse instantly a number of
established precedents concerning such issues as affirmative action, Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306, 349-78 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), prison
conditions, Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 37-42 (1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting), and
abortion, Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 980-1020 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
150
Cliff Sloan, Radical Justice, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 10, 2004), available at http://www.msnbc.
msn.com/id/6672836/site/newsweek/.
151
Id.
145
146
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For evidence of original intent, Thomas looked to the Federalist
Papers. To support his endorsement of plenary presidential power, he
quoted Alexander Hamilton in Federalist No. 23 as saying:
[the power to protect the Nation] ought to exist without
limitation: Because it is impossible to foresee and define
the extent and variety of national exigencies, or the
correspondent extent & variety of the means which may
be necessary to satisfy them. The circumstances that
endanger the safety of nations are infinite; and for this
reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed
on the power to which the care of it is committed.152
Although this quotation appears to strongly support Thomas’s
argument for unlimited executive authority, its presentation is deceptive
because Thomas omitted the first sentence of the paragraph that he is
quoting. A complete quotation of the paragraph would include the
following introductory sentence:
The authorities essential to the care of the common
defence are these—to raise armies—to build and equip
fleets—to prescribe rules for thegovernment of both—to
direct their operations—to provide for theirsupport.
These powers ought to exist without limitation . . . .153
In light of Hamilton’s actual words, the questions arise: In which
phrase does Thomas see support for presidential authority to impose
indefinite, incommunicado detention on American citizens? Is it a
component of “prescrib[ing] rules” for “rais[ing] armies” and
“equip[ping] fleets”? Is it implied by the power to “direct th[e]
operations” of armies and fleets? Because Hamilton’s words seem
specifically applied to creating and directing military forces, Thomas’s
omission of the introductory sentence appears calculated to imply that
Hamilton’s words endorsed plenary powers that could include
unreviewable detentions of U.S. citizens. Thomas’s actual conclusions
about Hamilton’s support for detention powers seem much weaker
when the entire quotation is read in context.
Another problem arises because Thomas’s presentation of and
reliance on Hamilton’s words in the Federalist Papers, a series of
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 2675 (2004) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, at 112
(Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Wills ed., 1982) (emphasis in original)).
153
THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, at 112 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Wills ed., 1982).
152
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newspaper columns advocating ratification of the Constitution,154 seem
to clash with the actual text of the Constitution. Article I of the
Constitution states that “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion
the public Safety may require it.”155 If there is an apparent clash between
a newspaper editorial being used to discern original intent and the
explicit words of the Constitution, it would seem that Thomas would
give greater weight to the text of the founding document. In his opinion,
Thomas gave greater weight to the primacy of national security than to
the words and intentions of the Habeas Suspension Clause by arguing
that there may be circumstances other than rebellion and invasion where
national security requires detentions without remedy.156
Thomas did not address the fact that Hamilton, the source of the
framers’ intentions on whom he purports to rely, emphasizes the
importance of access to habeas corpus as an essential protection for
liberty in Federalist No. 84.157 According to Hamilton:
[T]he practice of arbitrary imprisonments have been in
all ages the favorourite and most formidable
instruments of tyranny.
The observations of the
judicious Blackstone in reference to the latter, are well
worthy of recital. “To bereave a man of life (says he) or
by violence to confiscate his estate, without accusation
or trial, would be so gross and notorious an act of
despotism, as must at once convey the alarm of tyranny
throughout the whole nation; but confinement of the
person by secretly hurrying him to gaol, where his
sufferings are unknown and forgotten, is a less public, a
less striking, and therefore a more dangerous engine of
arbitrary government.” And as a remedy for this fatal
evil, he is every where peculiarly emphatical in his
encomiums on the habeas corpus act, which in one place
he calls, “the BULWARK of the British constitution.”158
In looking at both complete Hamilton quotations, the one partially
presented by Thomas and the later one concerning habeas corpus, it
might be easy to conclude that Hamilton’s words provide stronger
154
155
156
157
158
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Id. at x.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.2.
See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2683. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 435-36 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Wills ed., 1982).
Id. (emphasis in original).
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support for the other justices’ conclusion that Hamdi is entitled to access
to the courts than for Thomas’s argument that Hamilton endorses
unfettered presidential authority to detain U.S. citizens.
A further difficulty for Thomas’s reasoning is the fact that the
Federalist Papers address the original Constitution and not the
subsequently added provisions in the Bill of Rights that grant rights to
due process and representation by counsel. Indeed, Hamilton, Thomas’s
source of original intent, expressed opposition to the creation of a bill of
rights and therefore would not be an appropriate source for the framers’
later intentions concerning the Constitution’s liberty-protecting
amendments.159 Thus, Thomas’s examination of original intent is
incomplete because it omits consideration of many specific provisions of
the Constitution that were added to the original document in order to
articulate protections for various aspects of liberty.
V. CONCLUSION
In Hamdi, Clarence Thomas distinguished himself as the lone justice
who would grant the government virtually unfettered authority to label
American citizens as “enemy combatants” and then hold them in
indefinite incommunicado detention without any access to the courts
and without any legal protections under the Constitution. In many
respects, Thomas’s opinion in Hamdi was consistent with themes and
conclusions in his other opinions in which he seeks to limit judicial
power, disregards social reality and the human consequences of judicial
decisions, and minimizes legal protections for individuals held in
government custody. In other ways, however, his opinion in Hamdi
seems inconsistent with his purported adherence to a judicial philosophy
that emphasizes fealty to the Constitution’s text and the original
intentions of the framers. Despite frequently demonstrating disdain for
obedience to Supreme Court precedents, Thomas’s Hamdi opinion relies
heavily on precedents to make his case for plenary presidential power.
In purporting to rely on the framers’ intentions, Thomas makes an
incomplete and misleading presentation of Alexander Hamilton’s
writings in order to overstate support for unfettered presidential
authority while neglecting Hamilton’s words about the importance of
habeas corpus to prevent arbitrary detentions. Fundamentally, Thomas
gives scant attention to the framers’ intent to emphasize the protection of
individuals’ liberty in order to advance his preference for granting broad
power to the government, even when it may result in the erroneous
159

See id. at 437.
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detention of innocent Americans.160 Thus, Thomas’s Hamdi opinion
provides support for Professor Mark Graber’s analysis of the justice,
which concluded that Thomas “discards originalism completely when
that philosophy is hostile to certain conservative interests . . . . Justice
Thomas the originalist in theory fails to reduce judicial discretion by
refusing to be a consistent originalist in practice. History guides only
some of his judicial opinions.”161
Beyond the ways in which the Hamdi opinion illuminates general
issues about the consistency of Thomas’s judicial decision-making,
specific concerns arise when the Hamdi opinion is examined in light of
the predicted impending retirement of Chief Justice William
Rehnquist.162 In November 2004, President George W. Bush nominated
White House counsel Alberto Gonzales to replace retiring U.S. Attorney
General John Ashcroft.163
Gonzales was involved in crafting or
approving legal memoranda that justified the use of torture by American
officials as a means to gain information from suspected terrorists.164
Similarly, Thomas’s Hamdi opinion contains no recognition or concern
about the risks and realities of Americans’ use of and complicity in
torture as part of the “war on terrorism.”165 Thus, the rumors of
Thomas’s potential elevation to Chief Justice166 raise the disturbing
possibility that the two most visible officials in the U.S. government with
See supra text accompanying notes 48-54.
Graber, supra note 6, at 71, 88.
162
See supra text accompanying notes 1-2.
163
Dan Eggen, Gonzales Named to Succeed Ashcroft as Attorney General, WASH. POST, Nov.
11, 2004, at A01.
164
Id.; see also text accompanying notes 89-93.
165
In addition to questions about torturous techniques used by American interrogators,
the U.S. government also hands suspects to other countries that are known to use torture in
order to gain their assistance in extracting information. See Rafael Epstein, Detention and
Interrogation Methods in the War on Terror, LOCAL RADIO-AUSTRALIA, Mar. 3, 2003, available at
www.abc.net.au/am/stories/s796322.htm.
After speaking to ten currently serving U.S. national security officials
the Washington Post revealed the CIA’s interrogation or “stress and
duress” techniques. Blindfolded and manacled captives are kept
standing or kneeling for hours. They’re tied up in awkward, painful
positions and they’re deprived of sleep, held in tiny rooms for days at
a time. Those rooms are flooded with light or painfully loud noise.
Some are beaten when they’re initially arrested, thrown into the walls
while blindfolded . . . . After questioning, if they don’t cooperate,
they’re handed over, “rendered,” in official language, to foreign
intelligence services in countries like Morocco, Jordan, and Egypt,
countries where torture, including electrocution, has been
documented.
Id.
166
See supra text accompanying notes 4-6.
160
161
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responsibilities as the guardians and enforcers of law would be oblivious
to abuses of the sort that are specifically condemned under international
law.167 Thus, Thomas’s judicial opinions may have consequences not
only for individual Americans who are detained by the U.S. government
but also for the image of the American judiciary and governing system in
the eyes of the world.

167
See United Nations, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (Feb. 15, 1985), available at www.hrweb.org/legal/cat.html.
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